

Evaluating the Doab Crisis under Muhammad bin Tughlaq's Reign: Excessive Taxation or Climatic Adversities

Md. Zillal Hossain¹

¹Lecturer, Department of History, Jatiya Kabi Kazi Nazrul Islam University, Trishal, Mymensingh, Bangladesh

Abstract

The Doab crisis and agrarian rebellion under the reign of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq have generally been characterized as a result of excessive taxes and administrative irrationality. This study seeks to determine the real cause of the Doab crisis. Was it due to excessive taxation, or did environmental problems play a major role in worsening the situation? Based on contemporary chronicles, subsequent historiography, and environmental history methodologies, this study challenges the conventional historical narrative by arguing that the crisis was driven by ecological strain and climatic fluctuations, including the potential failure of the monsoon and drought, rather than by economic mismanagement and state policies. By doing this, the study aims to offer a more balanced view of how the government's policies, the farming community, and the environment interact in medieval India. The goal is to move beyond simple explanations, gain a more nuanced understanding of what happened during that time, and challenge the persistent misinterpretations of Muhammad ibn Tughlaq's reign, particularly the tendency in traditional history to portray him as an insane and failing ruler.

Keywords: Delhi Sultanate, Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Doab crisis, Misinterpretation, Excessive taxation, Ecological strain.

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Corresponding Author: Md. Zillal Hossain | **Email:** zillalhossain@jkkniu.edu.bd

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I. Introduction

The regime of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq from 1325 to 1351 is still extensively discussed among historians. He was optimistic, but some historians claimed that Tughlaq's decisions led to economic instability and public unhappiness. Most historians consider him a strange and unrealistic sultan because of the new policies he introduced during his reign, such as shifting the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad, issuing a new copper currency, and increasing taxes in the Doab region. According to Husain (1933) and Mehta (1981), his policy of taxation in the fertile Doab led to farmers struggling, people rebelling, famine, and economic decline. Because of this, the crisis in the Doab region is mentioned as an example of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq's failure as a leader. But it is also crucial to consider other factors that might have contributed to these issues and to evaluate different aspects of this period in history. The Doab region, located between the Ganges and Yamuna rivers, is known as a rich and fertile region of northern India. Its fertility made it one of the Delhi Sultanate's main sources of income. Most of the rulers derived more money from this region and used it to enrich the state treasury and run the state. Muhammad bin Tughlaq also decided to increase taxes in the Doab region to strengthen the state treasury and implement his military and administrative projects. Contemporary writer Ziauddin Barani criticized his decision to increase taxes. According to Barani (1862), "Excessive taxation impoverished the peasants, led to their displacement, rebellions, and the collapse of the agricultural system". Later historians agree with this view and attribute the Doab crisis to the Sultan's poor decisions and unfair tax policies. But such a general view raises important questions in history. The agricultural system of medieval India depended largely on weather and climate. Agriculture in South Asian countries, especially in India, was heavily dependent on the annual monsoon rains, and even minor changes in the weather significantly affected crop production and rural life, as evidenced by accounts of famines, food shortages, and crop failures during and after the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq. This example suggests that environmental issues may have played a much larger role in the Doab Crisis than historians have assumed. Despite the importance of climate and environment in shaping agrarian societies in the past, most studies on the Doab Crisis have focused primarily on excessive taxation and government policies, paying little attention to environmental factors. By considering these factors, we can better understand what actually happened in the Doab region during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq. It is also important to note that medieval historians often wrote little about environmental issues, so the impact of climate and environment on the Doab crisis may have been underestimated. Based on the evidence we have, it seems clear that environmental stress was a significant factor in the crisis, and it should be considered alongside taxation and government policies. The Doab crisis was likely the result of a combination of factors, including environmental stress, climatic conditions, and government policies. By studying these factors together, we can get a

more complete picture of what happened in the Doab region during Muhammad bin Tughlaq's rule, and how it affected the people living there. There is a major gap in how the general reader understands history, and this study aims to fill it. Colonial historians often portrayed him as a mad and uncontrolled leader of the East, whose great projects were believed to have failed due to his initiatives. Even after the colonial period, many historians believed that the main causes of the Doab crisis were revenue demand and excessive administrative rigidity. Although these studies provide some useful insights into taxation and government, they often ignore the fact that medieval agricultural systems were highly sensitive to environmental factors. From these studies, we will know exactly how climate change, agriculture, and government policies were related to one another during the Doab crisis. So, the environmental side of things hasn't been studied enough. Historians are taking a fresh look at how the environment and climate have shaped the past. They're realizing that we can't fully understand big decisions without considering the world around them. For example, scholars such as Irfan Habib and Richard Eaton have shown how important it is to consider agriculture, ecology, and the environment when studying the history of South Asia. This perspective helps us understand that decisions in the past were not only about politics, but also about nature. One area that hasn't been studied much from this perspective is the Doab crisis under Muhammad bin Tughlaq. This study seeks to challenge the conventional wisdom that portrays Muhammad bin Tughlaq as a poor decision-maker and a failed ruler. While some of his policies created major problems, it is not entirely fair to call all of his policies a complete failure. If we look at the facts, we can see that the Sultan sought to make positive changes, such as improving agriculture and helping farmers through the Diwan-i-Kohi (Ziaa al-Din Barni, 1862). This shows that his policies were more complicated than people usually think. It is time to move beyond the simplistic notion that he was just a bad leader and look at the bigger picture. This study fills the gap and determines the real cause of the Doab crisis. Was it due to excessive taxation, or did environmental problems also play a vital role in worsening the situation? To get a better answer, the study will examine the writings of contemporary scholars, the statements of later historians, and the environmental aspect. The goal is to move beyond simple explanations and get a more nuanced understanding of what happened during that time.

II. Literature Review

Unfortunately, there is insufficient official record of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq's tenure, and the only material available comes from his ambiguous autobiography. Although Tughluq Namah is an attempt to offer a genuine perspective on the life and policies of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq, the book *Tarikh-I-Firoz Shahi* was written by the historical figure and complicated person Ziauddin Barani. He served

as an official and financial counselor for Mohammad bin Tughlaq for a while, but portrays Muhammad Bin Tughlaq as an adversary of Islam and close to Hinduism. Ibn Battuta was also subject to some bias; even though he is a reliable historian through whom we can learn much about Tughlaq's reign. Ibn Battuta's mind, for some unknown reasons, was positively set against Tughlaq's initiatives. Chand & Parihar (2022) analyze the growth of agriculture during the Sultanate of Delhi period by examining the various policies enacted by the Delhi Sultans. They also show the conditions faced by farmers in India under these policies. Sonar & Anand (2025) focus on the tax system adopted during the Sultanate Period, centered on Alauddin Khilji and the Tughlaqs. Their study showed that excessive taxation by Alauddin Khilji was the primary cause of the peasants' pauperization. Rajeshwari (2023) explores the specific administrative policies established by Mohammad Bin Tughluq and aims to comprehend the political hurdles that shaped his decision-making. Singh & Singh (2018) discussed the introduction of a new copper coinage and types of tax during Mohammad Bin Tughluq. They also compare Prime Minister Narendra Modi to bringing new notes to the market, using a fallacy. Dr. Phani Kiran & M.K. Geetanjali (2024) work on Girish Karnad's drama, where he explores Muhammad Bin Tughlaq as a complex character. Although Karnad uses fiction to reconstruct history. Malik & Ahmed (2022) analyze famines, epidemics, and climate change in Medieval India, which were the result of human actions, and argue that policy failure was the primary factor behind the increased incidence of these events. Rashid (1964) discussed the condition of famine and the measures taken by the Turco-Afghan kings. Kaur (2019) explains the pre-established narrative on Muhammad Bin Tughlaq, that he is the most educated fool. Satendra Kumar Mishra (2015) has done masterclass work with his logic, emphasizing the innovation and creativity of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq. Moreover, explain that contemporary historians misinterpreted Muhammad Bin Tughlaq. On the other hand, Mishra S.K. holds that Tughlaq was a visionary scholar. Although previous studies have shed light on tax policies and administrative measures, most researchers have tried to show that the main causes of the crisis in the Doab region were economic exploitation and administrative failure, and the result of excessive taxation by the Sultan. However, the biggest limitation of these studies is that they did not consider the contemporary weather and climate. Only Satendra Kumar Mishra (2015) in his study stated that environmental factors are an important factor, but he also did not provide any detailed arguments in favor of environmental issues. Therefore, this research tries to overcome this gap by reevaluating the Doab issue through an interdisciplinary perspective that blends political, agrarian, and environmental history. Through this, the study aims to provide a more balanced explanation of the causes of the Doab crisis and challenge an important argument in the long-standing portrayal of Muhammad bin Tughlaq as simply a failed and irrational ruler who is the only reason for the Doab crisis.

III. Research Methodology

To analyze the Doab crisis during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, this inquiry sets its base on a qualitative and interdisciplinary historical approach. On top of that, the connection between economic policy and environmental issues is the main focal point of this investigation. This research is based on primary and secondary sources and depends on descriptive and historical approaches. Major primary sources are *Tarik-I-Firoz Shahi* by Ziauddin Barani, travel accounts of Ibn Battuta, *Tughlaq Namaha*, and contemporary writings, which give us information about the doab taxation, peasant conditions, and administrative policies during Muhammad Bin Tughlaq's reign. Except for *Tughlaq Namaha*, most of the sources have biased perspectives; this research evaluates their biases and the limitations of the narrative. As well, secondary sources by scholars, like Irfan Habib, Richard Eaton, and S. K Mishra, are contextualized in agrarian conditions, environmental sensitivity, and peasant responses. The study also draws on environmental history to examine the possible implications of drought, unpredictable monsoon patterns, and ecological stress on agricultural production, using indirect data such as allusions to famine, crop failure, migration, and rural distress. Despite the absence of direct climatic and quantitative economic data, which remains a limitation, the study relies on cross-reading and interpretative analysis to present a comprehensive assessment of the Doab problem beyond the typical story of administrative failure alone.

IV. Muhammad bin Tughlaq and His Doab Scheme

Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325–1351) was the second and most controversial Sultan of the Tughlaq dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate. His real name was Jauna Khan or Ulugh Khan. He was the son of Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq, the founder of the Tughlaq dynasty. Although there is disagreement among historians about his date of birth, it is believed that he was born in the last decade of the thirteenth century. From his childhood, he was well versed in Arabic, Persian, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, logic, and Islamic jurisprudence. Contemporary historians Ziauddin Barani and Ibn Battuta have praised him for his extraordinary intellect, memory, and learning. He ascended the throne of Delhi after the death of his father, Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq, in 1325. After ascending the throne, Muhammad bin Tughlaq made some well-thought-out plans to build a strong and centralized empire. Among his notable initiatives were the shifting of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad, the introduction of copper and brass token coins, the increase in land revenue in the Doab region, the establishment of the *Diwan-i-Kohi* for the development of agriculture, the preparation of the Khorasan and Iraq campaigns, and the Karachil (Himalayan region) expedition. The objectives of

these plans were to increase administrative efficiency, implement economic reforms, achieve geographical integration of the empire, and expand military power. However, many of the plans did not reach their destination due to administrative weakness, corruption, inadequate preparation, adverse public reaction, and contemporary economic and environmental realities. As a result, his reign is remembered for his bold and innovative state-planning, and on the other hand, it is considered one of the most controversial periods in medieval Indian history due to its limited implementation. Among the various policies he adopted, the increase in taxes in the Doab region was one of the most discussed initiatives, which is considered an important area in evaluating the effectiveness and limitations of his administration.

Muhammad Bin Tughlaq, very early in his reign, began to show an interest in taxation. The Doab was one of the most fertile and economically vital regions of the Delhi Sultanate. Its agricultural productivity made it a central source of revenue for the state. Consequently, any policy affecting this region had far-reaching implications for the Sultanate's economy (Jackson, 1999). Barani states that he increased it from "one to ten or one to twenty". This was merely a figure of speech and should not be interpreted literally as an increase of ten to twenty times or one in ten or twenty, that is, five to ten percent. In other places, Barani uses the terms "one to hundred" or "one to thousand" to indicate significant growth. (Ziaa al-Din Barni, 1862). In the broader context of fiscal expansion and imperial ambition, Muhammad bin Tughlaq's decision to raise taxes in this area makes sense. Revenue improvement was his primary objective because his massive military battles and administrative activities required significant financial resources. He attempted to increase the amount of land revenue collected from cultivators. He ordered the compilation of the revenue and consumption of all the provinces of his kingdom. As we mentioned, the Doab region between the Ganga and the Jamuna rivers was, and still is, a very fertile plain. Muhammad Bin Tuglaq suggested to his ministers that since the farmers of this region were rich, they could afford to pay more tax than those of less fertile regions (Singh & Singh, 2018). The idea itself was sound, but the execution was not because the administrative authorities' incompetence and nature behave differently. As a result, grain prices increased, and following the rain failure, a famine ensued that lasted for years (Singh & Singh, 2018).

The principal account of the Doab crisis is provided by Ziauddin Barani, who describes a significant increase in land revenue demands. According to Barani, this policy imposed severe strain on cultivators, leading to widespread distress and resistance (Barani, 1969). The increase in the assessment forced people to burn their crops, and they resorted to robbery (1332-1333) (Haig, 1922). Muhammad even ruined the crops and assassinated people of Baran (Bulandshahr), Dalmau, and Kanauj (Barani, 1969). This narrative seems like an immediate consequence of the Doab taxation, but it was the com-

bination of environmental issues and administrative incompetence in the final stage. Additionally, Alauddin Khalji increased land revenue in the Doab by half. He insisted on the measurement of taxes and made no concessions to the khuts and muqaddams, which made it difficult for the cultivators to provide taxes when the rains failed, either completely or partially. Even in this circumstance, the peasants, or khuts and muqaddams, had not rebelled. It was equally severe, Muhammad bin Tughlaq. As is well known, Barani exaggerated, as he frequently does, yet it is undeniable that there was a peasant uprising. Does this imply that Muhammad bin Tughlaq had effectively increased the land earnings to more than half of what Alauddin had requested? Barani, who was a critic of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, would have stated as much if that were the case. Forasmuch as the cause of peasant rebellion is not to impose the tax, then climate change, like drought, is the cause. Due to the impact of this climatic change, production decreased, and we saw a famine(1326-27) in the Doab at the same time. It is true that Alauddin Khalji was a strict ruler, so there may not have been much rebellion even after his tax hike, but it is also true that due to the excesses of natural calamities during the time of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, production decreased and ordinary farmers reacted. Later historians have largely relied on Barani's account, interpreting the episode as a result of excessive taxation and administrative failure (Husain, 1933). However, Barani's narrative reflects an elite perspective and incorporates moral judgments, which necessitate a critical reading of his work. A very shocking fact is that later historians only followed what was wrong and continued copying historical writings. Now, the question came to mind: Is Muhammad Bin Tughlaq responsible for this failure? When anyone takes the initiative or introduces a new policy, it takes time for him and his forces to figure things out and reach a satisfactory conclusion. When Muhammad Bin Tughlaq began efforts to extract revenue from the doab, the conditions were favorable, but bad luck meant that, when it was implemented, a catastrophic famine ensued (Satendra Kumar Mishra, 2015). Before making any plan, no one knows whether there will be a disaster during the implementation of the plan. The bad luck of Muhammad bin Tughlaq is that he had to face a natural disaster during the implementation of the Doab taxation. For this natural disaster, I think Muhammad Bin Tuglaq should not be condemned for the failure of the taxation scheme, as history suggests that no king controls the weather, and many wonderful initiatives have failed due to terrible weather. It happens till today.

V. Climate Variability and precedents of taxation in Medieval India

India's natural resources and prolific land have traditionally made it a popular destination for travelers. In the plains of the Indus and Ganges, rivers run year-round, creating extremely fertile soil that produces gold. Agricultural production in medieval India was highly dependent on climatic con-

ditions, particularly the monsoon. Variability in rainfall could significantly affect crop yields and rural livelihoods. As noted by Irfan Habib (1963), agrarian systems in pre-modern India were especially vulnerable to ecological fluctuations. Climate had a significant role in medieval India. Less rainfall in the Himalayas led to famines, wars, and rebellions, resulting in a population decline (M. H. Panhwar, 1983). As the snow melted slowly, it affected irrigation by reducing the water in the Indus River (M. H. Panhwar, 1983). The Delhi Sultanate was not immune to famines and epidemics. These natural catastrophes were the result of human factors. A drought occurred in Delhi during Sultan Iltutmish's rule (r. 1211-1236), and many people died of hunger (Rashid, 1964). Famine occurred during the reign of the Delhi Sultan, Jalal-ud-din Khilji (r. 1290-1296) (M. H. Panhwar, 1983). A drastic famine occurred under the Delhi Sultan, Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-1351) (Barani, 1969). As aridity increased throughout Firuz Shah Tughlaq's rule (1351–1388), he had to deal with the devastating effects of drought. Less rainfall between 1340 and 1400 AD sparked uprisings and ultimately led to the empire's fall (M. H. Panhwar, 1983). According to Nematullah, there was famine in various areas of Northern India during the reign of Sikandar Lodi. The frequency of climatic events shaped the character of normal conditions, and rainfall served as a key regulator of agricultural activity. Such a situation would have reduced agricultural production. This perspective highlights the importance of considering environmental factors alongside administrative policy. An explanation of the Doab crisis remains incomplete if environmental constraints are not taken into account. If we consider the environmental conditions during the time of Muhammad Bin Tughlaq, we would not be able to blame him for being a failed sultan. So, if we draw a conclusion about famine in the Doab area, the major causes were environmental factors.

During the reign of Ala-ud-din-Khilji, he was asked to pay taxes in the form of crops so that, in order to complete his economic policy, he could provide food and drink. Sultan Gyasuddin Tughlaq introduced the system of 'Crop Batai' (Singh, 2003). The government could get a portion of cash or food from Batai. The government usually fixes its share of food grains, and later its payment is fixed in cash based on the area's prices, or sometimes on the prices of the previous few years' crops. These methods have been around since ancient times. Feroze Shah had asked farmers to pay half of their taxes in kind in some parts of his kingdom, especially for vegetables and fruits. The government tax on such crops was based on the area under cultivation, with the average value of those crops factored in. According to Singh (2003), before the Middle Ages, Indian kings occupied 1/6 to 1/2 of the land. The practice of collecting land tax is not new; this legacy was inherited by the Muslim rulers. Initially, the Sultans feared that, if heavily taxed, non-Muslims would stop cultivating the land. Initially, farming was mainly in the hands of non-Muslims. The Sultans imposed a land tax of 1/10 on Muslim cultivators and 1/5 on non-Muslim cultivators. It was changed by the Sultans in different periods. But

Ala-ud-din Khilji increased this tax to 1/2, and Sultan Gyas-ud-Din reduced it to 1/10. Now, this rate has also been increased in the Doab region. Feroz Shah Tughlaq also kept the land tax up to 1/5. According to Dr. Kanunango, Sher Shah acquired 1/3 to 1/4 of the land, and in addition had to pay 'zari-bana' (land surveyor's fee) and 'mahasilana' (tax collector's fee). Both of these taxes ranged from 2% to 5% of the land tax (Singh, 2003). During the Mughal period, the Doab region was the main economic center of the empire. Akbar, with the help of his finance minister Todar Mal, introduced the famous 'Zabt System'. The tax was based on the average yield and average price of the last 10 years. Tax Rate: The tax rate for fertile land in the Doab region was 1 in 3 of the total crop produced. These taxes were collected in a strict but orderly manner directly through government employees. In addition, the Mughal treasury was strained during Aurangzeb's reign due to prolonged Deccan wars and huge military expenditures. As a result, he started collecting taxes again. During his reign, a maximum of half of the crop was collected as tax from the fertile land of the Doab region. He also reimposed the jizyah tax on non-Muslim peasants (Shome, 2021). The imposition of additional taxes by the Delhi Sultans led to intense resentment and reaction among the common people, peasants, and local zamindars of the Doab region. The people of this fertile region of the Ganges and Yamuna have been forced to revolt and sometimes have fled, leaving everything in order to survive. According to contemporary historian Ziauddin Barani, the tax burden was so high that there was no surplus grain or gold left in the homes of the farmers. During the reign of Alauddin Khalji, the local Hindu middlemen (Khut, Muqaddam and Chowdhury) who had earlier evaded taxes had become so poor that they gave up the habit of riding horses or wearing good clothes. During the reigns of Balban and Iltutmish, many people who were angry with the tax levy and disloyal to the Sultan's rule started robbing the highways around Delhi. This tax system also exists in the modern state system. And there are still many people who are struggling to make a living by paying taxes. But it is true that it is difficult to run a state without taxation. Because it is the main source of income for a state. Therefore, Muhammad bin Tughlaq, for his part, increased the taxes in the Doab region. Muhammad bin Tughlaq cannot be called a particularly insane or unrealistic ruler because the people are dissatisfied with every ruler. One of the important reasons for the failure of his plan or taxation was the contemporary natural disaster, which made the situation worse. Therefore, if we review history, we see that the issue of taxing agricultural land was ongoing as usual. In ancient or medieval times, such taxes served as a major source of state expenses. In medieval Europe, the military system was developed in response to the taxes imposed on the people. It is not appropriate, from a historical perspective, to blame Muhammad bin Tughlaq for the crisis that arose in the Doab region. If we evaluate from an impartial point of view, natural hostility should be considered the main reason, not any other.

VI. Tughluq's agricultural patronization

Muhammad Tughlaq took several steps to reduce people's suffering. He essentially had two types of famine policies: short-term and long-term. His short-term strategy was to provide relief right away. As a result, he distributed treasury presents to the people. (Ibn Battuta, 1958) says that when famine became out of control, the Sultan initiated the distribution of six months' provisions to all the people of Delhi. The panel of experts and jurists set out to register the names of residents in various residential areas, summon the populace, and provide individuals with food for 6 months. (Rashid, 1964). He also exempted taxes on foreign commodities coming to India. (Tripathi, 1936). He issued orders to sink wells. He provided the people with seeds and the requisite money. His long-term plan was to reform production by placing uncultivated land under the state's financial backing and direct control. A large area of land was selected, and an effort was made to grow a variety of crops in succession. Officials were assigned to oversee it. (Ziaa al-Din Barni, 1862). He dug wells throughout the empire to address the monsoon situation. This Tughlaq dynasty ruler is credited with being the first Indian monarch to use this tool to encourage extensive farming. In actuality, he was unwilling to give up even a small portion of his dominion to other forces. (Satish Chandra, 1997). He formed a special ministry to address this desire and assigned officials to take the required measures to promote cultivation and enhance crop standards. The Sultans of Delhi focused considerable attention on agricultural growth. The Department of Agriculture was founded by Muhammad bin Tughlaq. The department's name was "Diwan-e-Amir-e-Kuhi". Its key objectives were to expand agricultural regions and enhance the current crops. When Grain prices rose and, to top it off, there was no rainfall for a very long time, the crisis lasted about 7 years. Many relief camps were opened in Delhi, and food grains arrived from non-famine areas such as Awadh (Pandey & Choudhary, 2025). Muhammad bin Tughlaq had to deal with a problem that could have been solved in a very short time, but due to the absence of rain for a long time, it was tough to solve. Due to the absence of rain for a long time, agricultural production naturally decreased drastically, and Muhammad bin Tughlaq could not solve the problem with various forms of assistance. As a result, the farmers of Doab revolted against him.

If we review these activities for the development of agriculture, it will be easy to understand that Muhammad bin Tughlaq wanted to enrich the economy of the empire and mitigate the Doab crisis by taking various steps for the development of agriculture, in particular he took many initiatives to resolve the Doab crisis. Such activities can be seen in modern states. The state is investing in which sector, and it expects more profit from that sector. Therefore, the plan adopted by Muhammad bin Tughlaq for the Doab region must be considered positively.

VII. Conclusion

The agrarian crisis in the Doab during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq cannot be explained solely by taxation or administrative failure. Rather, it was also the consequences of the contemporary climate issues. This study discusses the Doab Plan of Muhammad bin Tughlaq and brings out many important facts about him. It shows that, due to India's environmental factors, agricultural production here often depends on the natural environment. Therefore, Muhammad bin Tughlaq cannot be called a failure without considering the natural environment. Besides, most of the previous rulers imposed excessive taxes on fertile lands; in this case, it would be unfair to blame Muhammad bin Tughlaq alone. Despite having many advanced technologies in the modern state system, many important steps have failed only due to natural disasters. Even today, the production of many lands in the Indian sub-continent, rich in agricultural potential, depends on natural conditions. Therefore, one of the vital reasons for the famine in the fertile Doab region during Muhammad bin Tughlaq's reign and the farmers' revolt was a decline in agricultural production due to natural disasters. And as a result, famine occurs and it's taken a long time. This paper recognized its crucial limitation in being unable to analyze exact environmental statistics of contemporary times. Still, it can be said that analyzing narratives about the contemporary weather, which has made Tughlaq's plans difficult to succeed. Most historians have described Muhammad bin Tughlaq's plan as a failed project. I think the project cannot be called a complete failure. The idea of expanding and developing agriculture through agricultural loans became a common practice during the reign of the later sultans and was part of the Mughal agricultural policy. Thus, Muhammad bin Tughlaq helped shape an agricultural policy that reached its perfection during the Mughal rule. A portion of historians believed Muhammad bin Tughlaq to be ahead of his time in thought, a perspective reflected in his Doab plan, which was proven after his reign.

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